


# Online Appendix—Not Intended for Publication

## A Additional Results

### A.1 Distribution of Preferences within the United States


Figures A.1 and A.2 generalize Figure 1 in the main text and display the distribution of each preference at the census division level. The left-hand side of each figure displays incentivized elicitation, while the right-hand side displays the corresponding qualitative self-assessments. In each case, there are marked differences between patterns corresponding to qualitative self-assessments and the respective incentivized elicitation.

Figure A.1: Risk tolerance, time preferences, and trust in the United States.



Notes: Data from combined U.S. Samples 1 and 2. Alaska and Hawaii are included in the Pacific division. Each variable is standardized, then collapsed to state level. The scale is in standard deviations, relative to a mean of 0.

Figure A.2: Altruism, reciprocity, and punishment in the United States.



Notes: Data from combined U.S. Samples 1 and 2. Alaska and Hawaii are included in the Pacific division. Each variable is standardized, then collapsed to state level. The scale is in standard deviations, relative to a mean of 0.

## A.2 Additional Correlations Between Qualitative Self-Assessments and Incentivized Elicitations

Table A.1 displays correlations between qualitative self-assessments and alternative incentivized elicitation of risk tolerance and punishment within U.S. Sample 1. Our preferred measure of risk tolerance elicited a participant’s Willingness-to-Accept payment for a lottery. This measure has the virtue of being similar to Falk et al. (2023)’s measure, and also being available in U.S. Sample 2 and the U.K. Sample. The survey also included a number of other elicitation of risk preferences, including participants’ Willingness-to-Pay for a lottery, their Certainty Equivalent for two lotteries, and their Certainty Equivalent for a draw from a risky urn and a draw from an ambiguous urn. For punishment, our preferred measure involves punishing the person that sent nothing back in a trust game, after receiving the maximum possible amount from the sender. We also elicited participants’ willingness to engage in “anti-social punishment”—punishing the person that sent the full amount in the same trust game (who then received nothing in return). Each of these measures was elicited twice. As can be seen, the correlations between our preferred measures and these alternative elicitation are of a similar magnitude.

Table A.2 presents the correlations between qualitative self-assessments and incentivized elicitation using the replication dataset from Falk et al. (2023). As in our representative sample (Table 4), qualitative self-assessments are often statistically significantly correlated with incentivized elicitation other than those they are intended to proxy for. Table A.3 compares the correlations in Falk et al. (2023) to those in the subsample of our data that most closely resembles Falk et al. (2023)’s design—participants in U.S. Study 1 that completed two surveys within one month (see Figure 3 and surrounding discussion). Both Spearman and Pearson correlations are significantly smaller in our data than in Falk et al. (2023). Tables A.6 and A.7 present correlations between qualitative self-assessments and incentivized elicitation within various sub-groups of our U.S. general population samples. In each case, we use one qualitative self-assessment, the average of two incentivized elicitation for risk

Table A.1: Correlations with Alternative Elicitations

	Within	Within Survey	
	1 Month	Averages	ORIV
Correlations with Risk Self-Assessment			
Preferred Measure	0.09* (.046)	0.12*** (.030)	0.13*** (.034)
Willingness To Pay	0.13** (.051)	0.17*** (.031)	0.19*** (.035)
Risk Aversion Urn	0.09* (.046)	0.10*** (.031)	0.11*** (.034)
Ambiguous Urn	0.15*** (.044)	0.17*** (.030)	0.19*** (.032)
Correlations with Punishment Self-Assessment			
Preferred Measure	0.08* (.047)	0.07** (.031)	0.09** (.038)
Anti-Social Punishment	0.09* (.046)	0.12*** (.030)	0.13*** (.034)
N	480	1,950	1,950

Notes: Data from U.S. Sample 1. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

tolerance and impatience, and a single incentivized elicitation of social preferences.

Table A.2: Correlations between Qualitative Self-Assessments and Incentivized Elicitations in Falk et al. (2023)

		Incentivized Elicitations					
		<i>Risk Tolerance</i>	<i>Impatience</i>	<i>Altruism</i>	<i>Trust</i>	<i>Reciprocity</i>	<i>Punishment</i>
Qualitative Self-Assessment	Risk Tolerance	0.32*** (.047)	-0.02 (.052)	-0.03 (.051)	0.09* (.049)	-0.10** (.052)	0.03 (.052)
	Impatience	0.09* (.051)	0.08 (.053)	0.08 (.049)	0.06 (.048)	-0.00 (.050)	0.01 (.047)
	Altruism	-0.02 (.054)	0.13** (.052)	0.39*** (.039)	0.16*** (.052)	0.24*** (.051)	-0.01 (.062)
	Trust	0.03 (.046)	0.19*** (.051)	0.17*** (.050)	0.27*** (.048)	0.23*** (.050)	-0.09* (.052)
	Reciprocity	-0.03 (.052)	0.12** (.050)	0.11** (.052)	0.23*** (.049)	0.22*** (.049)	-0.05 (.055)
	Punishment	0.05 (.053)	-0.00 (.052)	0.00 (.057)	0.05 (.059)	0.15*** (.053)	0.17*** (.062)

Notes: Data from Falk et al. (2023),  $N = 360$  for measures of reciprocity and punishment, and  $N = 382$  for all other domains. Correlations are Pearson correlations, with bootstrapped standard errors. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Color increases in intensity at each 0.05 of magnitude.

Table A.3: Comparison of Pearson and Spearman Correlations

	Correlation Between Self-Assessment and Incentivized Elicitation			
	Pearson		Spearman	
	Replication	Falk et al. (2023)	Replication	Falk et al. (2023)
Risk Tolerance	0.09* (.046)	0.32*** (.047)	0.10** (.043)	0.35*** (.046)
Impatience	-0.01 (.062)	0.08 (.053)	0.03 (.052)	0.05 (.052)
Altruism	0.14*** (.043)	0.39*** (.039)	0.13 (.045)	0.38*** (.044)
Trust	0.15*** (.056)	0.27*** (.047)	0.13** (.054)	0.28*** (.048)
Reciprocity	0.16** (.065)	0.22*** (.049)	0.13** (.053)	0.21*** (.049)
Punishment	0.08* (.047)	0.17*** (.063)	0.08 (.049)	0.16*** (.053)

Notes: Replication refers to correlations within one month, as in Figure 3 ( $N = 480$ ). Estimates for Falk et al. (2023) are based on their replication dataset. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table A.4: Correlations between Incentivized Elicitations, using ORIV

	<i>Risk Tolerance</i>	<i>Impatience</i>	<i>Altruism</i>	<i>Trust</i>	<i>Reciprocity</i>	<i>Punishment</i>
Risk Tolerance		-0.15*** (.038)	0.05 (.041)	0.07* (.042)	-0.00 (.040)	0.04 (.035)
Impatience	-0.15*** (.037)		-0.13*** (.039)	-0.17*** (.037)	-0.11*** (.037)	-0.07** (.034)
Altruism	0.05 (.041)	-0.13*** (.040)		1.02***,† (.030)	0.54*** (.040)	0.19*** (.042)
Trust	0.07* (.041)	-0.17*** (.038)	1.02***,† (.030)		0.67*** (.034)	0.18*** (.040)
Reciprocity	-0.00 (.040)	-0.11*** (.038)	0.54*** (.040)	0.67*** (.034)		0.22*** (.035)
Punishment	0.04 (.036)	-0.07** (.034)	0.19*** (.041)	0.18*** (.040)	0.22*** (.035)	

Notes: Data from U.S. Study 1, Week 0 ( $N = 1,950$ ). Correlations are using ORIV, with bootstrapped standard errors. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. † unlike a standard correlation coefficient, correlations estimated by ORIV do not have an upper bound of 1.



Table A.5: Correlations between Qualitative Self-Assessments, using ORIV

	<i>Risk Tolerance</i>	<i>Impatience</i>	<i>Altruism</i>	<i>Trust</i>	<i>Reciprocity</i>	<i>Punishment</i>
Risk Tolerance		0.16*** (.035)	0.19*** (.034)	0.27*** (.037)	0.20*** (.035)	0.30*** (.037)
Impatience	0.16*** (.035)		-0.03 (.033)	0.06* (.034)	-0.02 (.032)	0.17*** (.036)
Altruism	0.19*** (.034)	-0.03 (.033)		0.44*** (.028)	0.72*** (.033)	0.15*** (.036)
Trust	0.27*** (.036)	0.06* (.034)	0.44*** (.028)		0.39*** (.032)	0.14*** (.037)
Reciprocity	0.20*** (.035)	-0.02 (.032)	0.72*** (.033)	0.39*** (.032)		0.22*** (.037)
Punishment	0.30*** (.036)	0.17*** (.037)	0.15*** (.036)	0.14*** (.038)	0.22*** (.038)	

Notes: Data from U.S. Study 1, Week 0 ( $N = 1,950$ ). Correlations are using ORIV, with bootstrapped standard errors. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table A.6: Correlations between Qualitative Self-Assessments and Incentivized Elicitations, by Subgroup

	Risk	Impatience	Altruism	Trust	Reciprocity	Punishment
All	0.10*** (.022)	-0.00 (.022)	0.16*** (.021)	0.08*** (.019)	0.13*** (.023)	0.06*** (.020)
	$N = 4,950$					
ICAR: Above Median	0.16*** (.026)	-0.04 (.029)	0.16*** (.029)	0.08*** (.026)	0.15*** (.029)	0.12*** (.025)
	$N = 2,816$					
ICAR: Top ~ 10%	0.16*** (.056)	0.01 (.061)	0.26*** (.056)	0.16*** (.061)	0.18*** (.054)	0.18*** (.054)
	$N = 561$					
ICAR: Top ~ 5%	0.20** (.098)	0.12 (.090)	0.38*** (.073)	0.17** (.074)	0.15** (.075)	0.26*** (.067)
	$N = 235$					
CRT: No Questions Correct	0.07** (.029)	0.01 (.028)	0.14*** (.028)	0.06** (.026)	0.11*** (.032)	0.05* (.027)
	$N = 2,725$					
CRT: One or More Questions Correct	0.15*** (.029)	-0.00 (.035)	0.19*** (.030)	0.11*** (.029)	0.17*** (.029)	0.10*** (.029)
	$N = 2,225$					
CRT: All Three Questions Correct	0.18*** (.053)	-0.06 (.083)	0.22*** (.058)	0.18*** (.055)	0.17*** (.049)	0.05 (.071)
	$N = 500$					
High School or Less	0.08** (.038)	0.04 (.037)	0.15*** (.034)	0.09*** (.031)	0.14*** (.040)	0.04 (.035)
	$N = 1,689$					
Some College or College Degree	0.12*** (.025)	-0.06** (.027)	0.18*** (.028)	0.08*** (.024)	0.13*** (.028)	0.07*** (.025)
	$N = 2,690$					
Advanced Degree	0.12** (.054)	0.08 (.054)	0.08 (.074)	-0.03 (.071)	0.10* (.059)	0.19*** (.049)
	$N = 571$					
Response Time: Not Fastest 10%	0.11*** (.023)	-0.02 (.023)	0.16*** (.022)	0.07*** (.020)	0.13*** (.023)	0.06*** (.021)
	$N = 4,504$					
Response Time: Not Slowest or Fastest 25%	0.11*** (.030)	-0.05 (.033)	0.15*** (.030)	0.05** (.025)	0.11*** (.031)	0.07*** (.028)
	$N = 2,495$					

Notes: Data from combined U.S. Samples 1 and 2 ( $N = 4,950$ ). Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table A.7: Correlations between Qualitative Self-Assessments and Incentivized Elicitations, by Subgroup (Continued)


	Risk	Impatience	Altruism	Trust	Reciprocity	Punishment
All	0.10*** (.022)	-0.00 (.022)	0.16*** (.021)	0.08*** (.019)	0.13*** (.023)	0.06*** (.020)
	<i>N</i> = 4,950					
Female	0.10*** (.029)	-0.02 (.028)	0.11*** (.030)	0.06*** (.025)	0.11*** (.027)	0.04 (.026)
	<i>N</i> = 2,688					
Male	0.11*** (.032)	0.02 (.034)	0.21*** (.029)	0.09*** (.029)	0.15*** (.037)	0.08** (.032)
	<i>N</i> = 2,262					
Investor	0.10*** (.034)	-0.03 (.035)	0.09** (.039)	0.03 (.032)	0.10*** (.036)	0.08** (.033)
	<i>N</i> = 1,720					
Not Investor	0.10*** (.027)	0.00 (.027)	0.19*** (.024)	0.09*** (.023)	0.14*** (.029)	0.06** (.025)
	<i>N</i> = 3,230					
Age: Under 40	0.06 (.038)	0.03 (.039)	0.20*** (.033)	0.06* (.033)	0.10** (.042)	0.07* (.038)
	<i>N</i> = 1,694					
Age: 40 to 60	0.14*** (.035)	-0.06* (.036)	0.10** (.038)	0.10*** (.033)	0.18*** (.032)	0.06* (.033)
	<i>N</i> = 1,682					
Age: Over 60	0.11*** (.036)	-0.02 (.029)	0.16*** (.038)	0.07** (.029)	0.10*** (.034)	0.05* (.032)
	<i>N</i> = 1,574					
Above Median Income	0.11*** (.030)	-0.05 (.029)	0.13*** (.030)	0.05* (.029)	0.13*** (.026)	0.05* (.027)
	<i>N</i> = 2,491					
Above 90% Income	0.15*** (.054)	0.00 (.059)	0.03 (.071)	-0.00 (.059)	0.17*** (.048)	0.06 (.047)
	<i>N</i> = 646					
Above 95% Income	0.10 (.063)	0.03 (.041)	-0.06 (.086)	-0.08 (.077)	0.17*** (.065)	0.09 (.064)
	<i>N</i> = 395					

Notes: Data from combined U.S. Samples 1 and 2 (*N* = 4,950). Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

### A.3 Correlations with Demographics

Figure A.3 displays univariate correlations between preferences and various individual characteristics.

Figure A.3: Incentivized elicitations and qualitative self-assessments exhibit different correlations with individual characteristics.



Notes: Data from combined U.S. Samples 1 and 2 ( $N = 4,950$ ). Each panel displays univariate correlations between a demographic characteristic and each preference measure. Bars represent 90% confidence intervals.

Tables A.8 and A.9 display results for the same regressions as in Table 5 for the other four preference domains. In each case, the estimated relationships between qualitative self-assessments and demographic factors are essentially unchanged after controlling for incentivized elicitations. The only exception is the coefficient relating to cognitive ability and reciprocity, which becomes smaller and statistically insignificant.

Table A.10 shows results similar to those in Table 5 for risk tolerance and impatience using our two combined U.S. samples. For these two domains, we have duplicate elicitations in both samples. The results are similar to those reported in the main text. The only noteworthy difference is that the correlation between qualitative risk tolerance and stock investment is now statistically significant, as documented by Dohmen et al. (2011). However, as with the

Table A.8: Relationships between self-assessed impatience and trust and demographics are unrelated to variation in incentivized elicitation ( $N = 1,950$ ).

	Dependent Variable = Qualitative Self-Assessment					
	Impatience			Trust		
Cognitive Ability	0.08*** (.029)	0.08*** (.029)	0.06** (.030)	-0.04 (.028)	-0.08*** (.027)	-0.06* (.029)
Male	0.06 (.056)	0.06 (.056)	0.05 (.056)	-0.05 (.056)	-0.07 (.056)	-0.06 (.056)
Age	-0.14*** (.029)	-0.15*** (.029)	-0.14*** (.029)	0.16*** (.029)	0.16*** (.028)	0.17*** (.028)
Education	-0.05 (.031)	-0.05 (.031)	-0.05 (.031)	-0.01 (.033)	-0.01 (.032)	-0.00 (.031)
Income (Log)	-0.05 (.035)	-0.05 (.035)	-0.07** (.034)	0.01 (.033)	0.00 (.034)	0.01 (.035)
Stock Investor	0.06 (.069)	0.06 (.068)	0.05 (.067)	0.10 (.067)	0.09 (.066)	0.10 (.066)
Incentivized Elicitation:						
Risk Tolerance			-0.03 (.037)			0.05 (.036)
Impatience		-0.01 (.036)	-0.00 (.036)			0.07* (.036)
Altruism			-0.05 (.116)			0.21* (.120)
Trust			0.26** (.132)		0.21*** (.047)	0.11 (.133)
Reciprocity			-0.14** (.056)			-0.09 (.054)
Punishment			0.01 (.039)			-0.05 (.038)

Notes: All columns use data from U.S. Sample 1. Incentivized elicitation are instrumented to eliminate the effect of classical measurement error. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) on all continuous measures are standardized. All specifications include an indicator variable for missing income. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

other demographic factors, this relationship is not driven by preferences captured by the corresponding incentivized elicitation.

Figure A.4 compares the average preferences within our low-education U.K. Sample to

Table A.9: Relationships between demographics and self-assessed reciprocity and willingness-to-punish are unrelated to variation in incentivized elicitation ( $N = 1,950$ ).

	Dependent Variable = Qualitative Self-Assessment					
	Reciprocity			Punishment		
Cognitive Ability	0.09*** (.029)	0.06** (.028)	0.04 (.031)	-0.01 (.027)	-0.00 (.027)	-0.00 (.029)
Male	-0.02 (.057)	-0.04 (.057)	-0.05 (.056)	0.26*** (.059)	0.25*** (.059)	0.25*** (.059)
Age	0.20*** (.029)	0.18*** (.029)	0.18*** (.028)	-0.02 (.031)	-0.03 (.030)	-0.03 (.030)
Education	-0.05 (.030)	-0.05 (.029)	-0.04 (.029)	0.02 (.032)	0.03 (.032)	0.03 (.032)
Income (Log)	0.03 (.035)	0.04 (.033)	0.02 (.034)	-0.02 (.036)	-0.03 (.035)	-0.03 (.036)
Stock Investor	0.08 (.063)	0.08 (.060)	0.06 (.058)	0.12* (.067)	0.12* (.069)	0.12* (.069)
Incentivized Elicitation:						
Risk Tolerance			-0.04 (.039)			0.03 (.041)
Impatience			-0.06 (.037)			0.00 (.037)
Altruism			0.24** (.111)			0.06 (.125)
Trust			0.07 (.124)			0.02 (.143)
Reciprocity		0.21*** (.046)	0.04 (.053)			-0.04 (.058)
Punishment			0.05 (.036)		0.15*** (.042)	0.14*** (.041)

Notes: All columns use data from U.S. Sample 1. Incentivized elicitation are instrumented to eliminate the effect of classical measurement error. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) on all continuous measures are standardized. All specifications include an indicator variable for missing income. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

those across the whole U.S. population.

Table A.10: Findings regarding the relationships between qualitative self-assessments and demographics are similar using combined U.S. Samples ( $N = 4,950$ ).

	Dependent Variable = Qualitative Self-Assessment			
	Risk Tolerance		Impatience	
Incentivized Measure		0.13*** (.026)		-0.01 (.026)
Cognitive Ability	-0.12*** (.019)	-0.12*** (.019)	0.09*** (.019)	0.09*** (.020)
Male	0.31*** (.039)	0.31*** (.039)	0.05 (.039)	0.05 (.039)
Age	-0.13*** (.021)	-0.14*** (.021)	-0.13*** (.020)	-0.13*** (.020)
Education	0.04** (.021)	0.05** (.021)	-0.03 (.021)	-0.03 (.021)
Income (Log)	0.01 (.024)	0.01 (.024)	-0.04* (.023)	-0.04* (.023)
Stock Investor	0.12*** (.043)	0.13*** (.043)	0.05 (.044)	0.05 (.044)


Notes: All columns use data from U.S. Samples 1 and 2. Incentivized elicitations are instrumented to eliminate the effect of classical measurement error. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) on all continuous measures are standardized. All specifications include an indicator variable for missing income. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

## A.4 Correlations with Self-Reported Behaviors

In this section we examine correlations between qualitative self-assessments and self-reported behaviors, for a subset of U.S. Sample 2. Data for part of this sample was collected as part of a five-wave survey. The main text analyzes the first wave. In waves 3 to 5 of the survey, we elicited self-reported behaviors relating to charitable giving, community engagement, health behaviors, and political interest.<sup>1</sup> Some previous studies have suggested that self-assessments may be valuable based on their ability to predict such activities. Here, we examine the relationships between these behaviors, qualitative self-assessments, and incentivized preference measures in this survey.

<sup>1</sup>YouGov provides separate probability weights for each survey wave. We use sample weights from the first survey in waves 3 to 5 that a participant completed.

Figure A.4: Comparison of low-education U.K. Sample to U.S. general population.



Notes: The figure compares the average preference within the two U.S. representative samples ( $N = 4,950$ ) and the U.K. Sample ( $N = 1,984$ ).



Table A.11: Relationships between qualitative self-assessments and behaviors.

	Risk	Impatience	Altruism	Trust	Reciprocity	Punishment
Smoke	0.30*** (.078)	0.08 (.091)	0.16** (.079)	-0.04 (.102)	0.21*** (.074)	0.07 (.076)
Binge Drink	0.43*** (.091)	0.20** (.082)	-0.02 (.085)	0.18** (.079)	0.08 (.069)	0.17** (.078)
Eat 5 Fruit/Veg A Day	0.32*** (.064)	-0.12* (.063)	0.07 (.064)	0.11* (.063)	0.01 (.065)	0.01 (.060)
Exercise	0.38*** (.063)	-0.19*** (.062)	0.15** (.066)	0.13** (.060)	0.13** (.065)	0.08 (.059)
Attended Local Political Meeting	0.32*** (.093)	0.18** (.078)	0.27*** (.077)	0.18** (.085)	0.22*** (.072)	0.27*** (.078)
Put Up Political Sign	0.19** (.079)	0.15** (.077)	0.26*** (.068)	0.08 (.082)	0.30*** (.064)	0.23*** (.073)
Worked for Political Campaign	0.33*** (.110)	0.30*** (.111)	0.28*** (.098)	0.17 (.119)	0.13 (.102)	0.18* (.094)
Donated to Campaign	0.30*** (.068)	0.18*** (.065)	0.29*** (.066)	0.14** (.068)	0.33*** (.052)	0.24*** (.058)
Donated Blood	0.40*** (.097)	0.08 (.101)	0.30*** (.086)	0.20** (.096)	0.26*** (.089)	0.10 (.095)
Worked for Community	0.36*** (.069)	0.17*** (.065)	0.41*** (.057)	0.09 (.071)	0.26*** (.060)	0.18*** (.067)
Contacted Govt Official	0.19*** (.063)	0.23*** (.063)	0.34*** (.056)	0.03 (.069)	0.26*** (.056)	0.22*** (.051)
Community Meeting	0.45*** (.074)	0.19*** (.068)	0.37*** (.058)	0.19** (.074)	0.28*** (.058)	0.19*** (.070)
Volunteer Work	0.00 (.002)	0.00 (.002)	0.01*** (.003)	0.00 (.002)	0.01*** (.003)	0.00 (.002)
Church/Charity Contribution	0.23*** (.066)	-0.08 (.061)	0.59*** (.061)	0.31*** (.058)	0.44*** (.062)	-0.03 (.058)
Church Attendance	0.12*** (.033)	-0.00 (.033)	0.25*** (.030)	0.18*** (.031)	0.12*** (.028)	-0.01 (.030)
# Organizations Member of	0.17*** (.026)	0.08*** (.025)	0.15*** (.029)	0.09*** (.026)	0.11*** (.029)	0.09*** (.025)
#Days Talked Politics	0.07** (.030)	0.02 (.029)	0.20*** (.034)	0.09*** (.030)	0.23*** (.027)	0.06** (.026)
Read Blog	0.14** (.063)	0.22*** (.061)	0.13** (.061)	0.05 (.063)	0.20*** (.059)	0.08 (.059)
Watched TV News	0.08 (.065)	-0.11* (.062)	0.35*** (.072)	0.31*** (.065)	0.31*** (.070)	0.11* (.063)
Read Newspaper	0.26*** (.060)	-0.03 (.060)	0.21*** (.058)	0.24*** (.058)	0.28*** (.057)	0.02 (.053)
Listened to Radio	0.19*** (.064)	0.12** (.057)	0.23*** (.059)	0.14** (.054)	0.13** (.064)	0.12** (.053)

Notes: All columns use data from U.S. Sample 2, waves 3–5 ( $N = 4,134$ ). Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) on all continuous measures are standardized. Standard errors are clustered by participant. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

First, Table A.11 presents simple correlations between each of the qualitative self-assessments and different self-reported activities. Most variables in this table are binary, taking a value of one if a participant reported an activity, and zero otherwise. Exceptions include church attendance, the (square-root of the) number of organizations a participant is a member of, and the number of days a participant spent discussing politics, where these variables are all standardized. Since some individuals responded to multiple waves of the survey, we cluster standard errors by participant.

As can be seen, qualitative self-assessments are correlated with a wide range of behaviors, sometimes in unexpected ways. For instance, we replicate the finding of Dohmen et al. (2011) that self-reported willingness to take risks is correlated with smoking.<sup>2</sup> However, it is also correlated with almost every other behavior in our dataset, including the seemingly low risk behavior of eating five portions of fruit and vegetables per day. We also see that the social preference measures are correlated with a wide range of activities relating to charitable activity, engagement with local politics, and political interest.

To aid interpretation of this large battery of variables, we carry out two principal components analyses—see Figure A.5 and Tables A.12–A.13. In each analysis, we determine the number of components to retain using parallel analysis. The first principal components analysis includes the four variables, at the top of Table A.11, related to health behaviors. This analysis, reported in Table A.12, identifies two intuitive components—*Unhealthy Behaviors* (primarily capturing smoking and drinking more than five alcoholic drinks) and *Healthy Behaviors* (loading on exercise, eating five fruit and/or vegetables a day). The second analysis, reported in Table A.13, includes the remaining variables, which relate to involvement in a participant’s local community, volunteering or giving to charity, political activity, and media use. This identifies three components. *Political Engagement* primarily relates to political activities such as working for a political candidate or working to tackle issues in the local community. *Charity/Community* relates primarily to volunteering, religious attendance, and

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<sup>2</sup>See Arslan et al. (2020, Supplementary Materials S1) for a general review of studies assessing relationships between the qualitative self-assessment of risk and behaviors.

Figure A.5: Scree Plots for Principal Components Analyses.




Table A.12: Principal Components Analysis for Health Behaviors.

	<i>Unhealthy Behaviors</i>	<i>Healthy Behaviors</i>	Unexplained
Do you currently...			
Smoke cigarettes, cigars, or pipes	0.72	-0.12	0.34
Drink five or more alcoholic drinks occasionally	0.70	0.13	0.36
Exercise	0.00	0.69	0.42%
Eat five or more servings of fruits and/or vegetables a day	-0.01	0.70	0.40
Percent of Variation	32%	31%	38%

Notes: The principal components analysis used data from waves 3–5 of U.S. Sample 2 ( $N = 4,134$ ). Each question offered participants a choice of yes or no.

contributing to church and charity. *Political Interest* captures variance relating to the use of media, and discussing politics with friends and family.

Figure A.6 shows correlations between these five principal components and both incentivized elicitations and qualitative self-assessments. Both types of measures are correlated with several behavioral variables, but the patterns are markedly different, particularly for


Table A.13: Principal Components Analysis for Political and Community Activities.

	<i>Political Engagement</i>	<i>Charity/ Community</i>	<i>Political Interest</i>	Unexplained
During the past year did you...				
Attend local political meetings	0.43	-0.03	-0.05	0.48
Put up a political sign	0.33	0.07	-0.16	0.65
Work for a candidate or campaign	0.40	-0.07	-0.08	0.57
Donate money to a candidate, campaign, or political organization	0.32	0.15	-0.14	0.60
Donate blood	0.14	-0.12	0.21	0.85
Indicate whether in past 12 months you...				
Worked with other people to deal with some issue facing your community	0.35	-0.01	0.14	0.52
Telephoned, wrote a letter to, or visited a government official to express your views on a public issue	0.28	0.16	-0.01	0.61
Attended a meeting about an issue facing your community or schools	0.36	-0.05	0.12	0.54
In past 12 months devoted time or made contributions...				
Did volunteer work	-0.04	0.14	0.08	0.95
Contributed to church and charity	0.01	0.10	0.56	0.36
How often attend church	-0.04	-0.05	0.65	0.33
# of organizations a member of	0.25	-0.02	0.31	0.55
In past 24 hours have you.....				
Read a blog	-0.03	0.34	0.13	0.71
Watched TV news	0.05	0.40	-0.12	0.66
Read a newspaper in print or online	-0.00	0.47	0.01	0.55
Listened to a radio news program or talk radio	-0.16	0.41	0.08	0.69
# Days in last week discussed politics with friends/family	0.06	0.47	-0.01	0.50
Percent of Variation	18%	12%	10%	60%

Notes: The principal components analysis used data from waves 3-5 of U.S. Sample 2 ( $N = 4,134$ ).

risk and impatience. Interestingly, however, both incentivized and self-assessment measures of altruism, trust, and reciprocity have predictive power for behaviors related to political engagement, political interest, and charitable giving/community engagement. Bigger dif-

Figure A.6: Correlations between principal components of self-reported behaviors and preferences.



Notes: The figure uses data from U.S. Sample 2, waves 3–5 ( $N = 4,134$ ). Standard errors are clustered by participant. Bars represent 90% confidence intervals.

ferences appear in the realm of risk and, to a lesser extent, impatience. This indicates that incentivized measures may have better predictive power than might be suggested by examining risk measures alone (Charness et al., 2020).

Finally, in Table A.14, we present regression results similar to those in Table 5. That table indicated whether correlations between demographic characteristics and qualitative self-assessments capture behavior on incentivized elicitation. Here, we investigate whether the correlations with demographics are explained by a participant’s behavior outside of the survey—if so, this could suggest that self-assessments are capturing some other latent factor that predicts behavior, but is not captured in incentivized elicitation. We also test whether the correlations between qualitative self-assessments and self-reported behaviors are explained by the incentivized elicitation. The surveys that included questions about behaviors included only a single incentivized elicitation of altruism (as with the initial survey in U.S. Study 2 that we study in the main text). As such, to account for measurement error,

we use the incentivized elicitation of trust as an instrument for altruism. The first stage F-statistic is 96.2, suggesting that this is appropriate.<sup>3</sup>

The results in Table A.14 show that, consistent with the correlations in Table A.11, the risk and altruism measures are correlated with a range of behaviors, not only those most obviously related to each preference. Second, with the possible exception of education, the coefficients related to demographic variables are little affected by the inclusion of self-reported behaviors. This suggests that the correlations between demographics and self-assessments are not reflected in different behaviors outside the survey. For instance, if women appear more altruistic based on self-assessments, this does not translate into increased giving in the dictator game or higher (self-reported) charitable contributions. Third, the correlations between self-reported behaviors and self-assessments are close to unchanged after controlling for the incentivized measures. That is, the variation between self-reported behaviors and qualitative self-assessments is not correlated with variation in the incentivized elicitation.

## **B Data Sources and Screenshots**

### **B.1 General Population Datasets**

Our general population datasets are drawn from a number of incentivized online surveys. Each survey was conducted by YouGov, a commercial survey company. Participants in the three representative samples were drawn from YouGov’s two-million-person survey panel. YouGov obtains nationally representative samples by using targeted quota sampling and then constructing sample weights to account for the fact that some demographic groups are underrepresented. See Chapman et al. (2024b) for further discussion of the composition of the YouGov survey panel and payment procedure. Typically, each survey took around 45 minutes to one hour to complete, with payment approximately three times the average

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<sup>3</sup>The incentivized risk tolerance elicitation included in these surveys was slightly different from the elicitation in the original survey of U.S. Sample 2, which we analyze in the main text.

Table A.14: Relationships between qualitative self-assessments, demographics, and behaviors.

	Dependent Variable = Qualitative Self-Assessment					
	Risk Tolerance			Altruism		
Cognitive Ability	-0.12*** (.031)	-0.10*** (.028)	-0.09*** (.028)	0.01 (.030)	0.01 (.029)	0.00 (.029)
Male	0.23*** (.069)	0.18*** (.063)	0.17*** (.063)	-0.20*** (.067)	-0.22*** (.060)	-0.23*** (.059)
Age	-0.08** (.033)	-0.10*** (.033)	-0.10*** (.033)	0.13*** (.031)	0.05 (.031)	0.04 (.031)
Education	0.10*** (.035)	0.04 (.035)	0.04 (.035)	-0.01 (.032)	-0.09*** (.031)	-0.08*** (.030)
Income (Log)	0.07* (.037)	0.03 (.033)	0.03 (.033)	0.11*** (.037)	0.06* (.034)	0.07** (.034)
Behaviors:						
Unhealthy Activities		0.15*** (.031)	0.15*** (.031)		-0.02 (.028)	-0.02 (.028)
Healthy Activities		0.16*** (.031)	0.16*** (.031)		0.05* (.030)	0.05 (.030)
Political Engagement		0.08*** (.023)	0.08*** (.023)		0.05** (.025)	0.06** (.025)
Political Interest		0.12*** (.029)	0.12*** (.029)		0.27*** (.030)	0.26*** (.031)
Charity / Community		0.06* (.031)	0.05* (.031)		0.12*** (.035)	0.11*** (.036)
Incentivized Measure			0.06* (.033)			0.13*** (.046)

Notes: All columns use data from U.S. Sample 2, waves 3–5 ( $N = 4,134$ ). Incentivized measures are instrumented to eliminate the effect of classical measurement error. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) on all continuous measures are standardized. All specifications include an indicator variable for missing income. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

for similar surveys. In each survey, participants were paid for either one or two randomly-selected questions.

## B.2 Data Sources and Screenshots

In this section, we provide illustrative screenshots from our various samples. These are broken into two groups. One contains the U.S. Samples, U.K. Sample, and Pitt student sample, which all used the same survey platform, and thus had a similar look and feel, as well as identical incentive levels. The Caltech, UBC, and MTurk samples were on a different survey platform, and those measures thus had a different look and feel.

In the U.S., U.K., and Pitt samples, rewards for incentivized questions were expressed via “points”, an internal YouGov currency used to pay panel members. These points can be converted into monetary compensation or prizes, using the approximate rate of \$0.001 per point. YouGov allows points to be converted to awards at specific point values, which leads to a slightly convex payoff schedule. This convexity does not appear to distort behavior—see Chapman et al. (2024b, Appendix C.6) for a detailed discussion. In the Caltech, UBC, and MTurk samples, rewards for incentivized questions were expressed via “tokens.” At Caltech, each 100 tokens translated to \$1, while at UBC, each 100 tokens translated to \$1CAD. On MTurk, where payments are generally lower, 300 tokens translated to \$1.



Figure B.1: Qualitative Self-Assessment of Risk Tolerance (with 8 selected, U.S. and U.K.)



How do you see yourself: are you a person who is generally willing to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?

Completely unwilling to take risks  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Very willing to take risks



Figure B.2: Qualitative Self-Assessment of Impatience (U.S. and U.K.)



How well does the following statement describe you as a person?

"I tend to postpone things even though it would be better to get them done right away."

Does not describe me at all  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Describes me perfectly



Figure B.3: Qualitative Self-Assessment of Altruism (U.S., U.K., and Pitt)



How would you assess your willingness to share with others without expecting anything in return, for example your willingness to give to charity?

Completely unwilling to share with others  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Very willing to share with others



Figure B.4: Qualitative Self-Assessment of Trust (U.S., U.K., and Pitt)



How well does the following statement describe you as a person?

"As long as I am not convinced otherwise I always assume that people have only the best intentions."

Does not describe me at all



Describes me perfectly



Figure B.5: Qualitative Self-Assessment of Reciprocity (U.S., U.K., and Pitt)



How would you assess your willingness to return a favor to a stranger?

Completely unwilling to return a favor



Very willing to return a favor



Figure B.6: Qualitative Self-Assessment of Punishment (U.S. and U.K.)



Are you a person who is generally willing to punish unfair behavior even if this is costly?

Completely unwilling to punish unfair behavior if there is a personal cost



Very willing to punish unfair behavior if there is a personal cost



Figure B.7: Incentivized Elicitation of Risk Tolerance (U.S., U.K., and Pitt)



For this question, you are given a lottery ticket that has a **50% chance** of paying you **9,000 points**, and a **50% chance** of paying you **1,000 points**.

You have two options for this lottery ticket:

1. Keep it or
2. Sell it for a certain amount of points (for example, 3,000 points)

For each row in the table below, which option would you prefer?

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 0 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 1,000 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 2,000 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 2,500 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 3,000 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 3,250 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 3,500 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 3,750 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 4,000 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 4,250 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 4,500 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 4,750 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 5,000 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 5,250 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 5,500 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 6,000 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 7,000 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 8,000 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 9,000 points
<input type="checkbox"/> The lottery ticket	or	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sell it for 10,000 points

Reset

Autofill

[Review the instructions](#)

Figure B.8: Incentivized Elicitation of Impatience (U.S. and U.K.)



For each row in the table below, which option would you prefer?

- |   |    |   |
|---|----|---|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17) | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 0 points today     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 1,000 points today |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 2,000 points today |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 3,000 points today |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 3,500 points today |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 4,000 points today |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 4,500 points today |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 5,000 points today |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 5,500 points today |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 5,600 points today |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 5,700 points today |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 5,800 points today |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 5,900 points today |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 5,950 points today |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 5,975 points today |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points today |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6,000 points in 90 days (November 17)            | or | <input type="checkbox"/> 6,100 points today |

Reset

Autofill

Figure B.9: Incentivized Elicitation of Altruism (U.S. and U.K.)



For this question we will give you 6,000 points, and you are matched with a **different** person from the one you were matched with in any other question.

You can send, some, all, or none of this to the other survey taker. The amount you send will be deducted from the 6,000 points given to you for this question.

How much would you like to send the other survey taker?

- 0
- 1,000
- 2,000
- 3,000
- 4,000
- 5,000
- 6,000



Figure B.10: Incentivized Elicitation of Trust (U.S. and U.K.)



For this question we will give you 6,000 points, and you are matched with a **different** person from the one you were matched with in the last two questions.

You can send, some, all, or none of this to the other survey taker. Whatever amount you send will be doubled by us, and the other taker will have the opportunity to send any amount of that back to you. Whatever amount the other taker sends back to you will be doubled again.

So, if you chose to send 1,000 points, you will keep 5,000 points and the other taker will get 2,000 points that they can choose to send back to you, or not. If they send 2,000 points back, you will receive an additional 4,000 points (9,000 points in total). If they send 0 points back, you will have only the 5,000 points you didn't send.

How much would you like to send to the other survey taker?

- 0
- 1,000
- 2,000
- 3,000
- 4,000
- 5,000
- 6,000



Figure B.11: Incentivized Elicitation of Reciprocity (U.S. and U.K.)

If the previous question is selected for payment, we will let you know how much the other survey taker sent back to you at the end of the survey.

In order that you may be matched with a future survey taker, we would like to know how much you would send back, if someone sent you varying amounts of points. Please keep in mind that however much you send back will be doubled by us.

Please tell us how much you would send back if:

the other person sent you 1,000 points, so you have 2,000 points you can keep, or send some back

the other person sent you 2,000 points, so you have 4,000 points you can keep, or send some back

the other person sent you 3,000 points, so you have 6,000 points you can keep, or send some back

the other person sent you 4,000 points, so you have 8,000 points you can keep, or send some back

the other person sent you 5,000 points, so you have 10,000 points you can keep, or send some back

the other person sent you 6,000 points, so you have 12,000 points you can keep, or send some back



Figure B.12: Incentivized Elicitation of Punishment (U.S. and U.K.)

YouGov

We will allow you to observe a similar back-and-forth by two *other* people.

As with the previous question, any amount sent from one individual to the other is doubled. The first person sent **6,000 points** to their partner out of the 6,000 they had. The partner then returned **0 points** out of the 12,000 they had. That is, in the end, the first person received **0 points** on this question and the partner received **12,000 points**.

For this question, we will also give you 4,000 points. Any points you do not use will be yours to keep, if this question is selected for payment.

You will now have the opportunity to punish either or both of these people. For every **100 points** you spend, you will reduce the amount they get by **600 points**.

**No other survey taker will have the ability to punish you, so you do not need to worry about any of your previous answers.**

Note that if this question is selected for payment, you will be **the only person** who is selected to punish either player. If you choose not to punish at all, both people will get the payments described above and you will keep the 4,000 points.

How many points do you want to use to punish the first person, who sent 6,000 points (out of 6,000)? You may use up to 2,000 points, which will take up to 12,000 points away from the first person.

How many points do you want to use to punish the second person, who sent back nothing (out of 12,000)? You may use up to 2,000 points, which will take up to 12,000 points away from the second person.



Figure B.13: Qualitative Self-Assessment of Risk Tolerance (Caltech, UBC, and MTurk)

How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?

Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: 'not at all willing to take risks' and the value 10 means: 'very willing to take risks.'

- 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10

Figure B.14: Qualitative Self-Assessment of Impatience (Caltech)

How well does the following statement describe you as a person? 'I tend to postpone things even though it would be better to get them done right away.' Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'does not describe me at all' and a 10 means 'describes me perfectly.'

- 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10

Figure B.15: Qualitative Self-Assessment of Altruism (Caltech, UBC, and MTurk)

How would you assess your willingness to share with others without expecting anything in return, for example your willingness to give to charity? 0 means: 'not at all' and 10 means: 'very willing to share.'

0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10



Figure B.16: Incentivized Elicitation of Risk Tolerance (Caltech, UBC, and MTurk)

**Urn with Equal Number of Red and Black Balls**

The urn from which we can draw a ball is composed of 15 red balls and 15 black balls.

The urn gamble pays 150 tokens if the ball drawn is black.

For each row below, think about whether you prefer the urn gamble, or the sure amount on the right. If you prefer some sure amount to the urn gamble, then we will assume that you prefer any amount greater than that to the gamble as well, and fill in the other options accordingly.

However, this automatic filling will often be premature. Therefore, you should keep clicking on options you prefer until the choice in each row indicates exactly what you would prefer. This is important, because when you submit your preferences, we will pick one row at random and pay you accordingly. If you selected the sure amount in that row, we will pay you that amount. If you selected the urn gamble in that row, we will draw a ball from the urn, and pay you accordingly.

What would you rather receive (make sure a radio button in each row is selected)?

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input checked="" type="radio"/> Urn Gamble | <input type="radio"/> 0 tokens              |
| <input checked="" type="radio"/> Urn Gamble | <input type="radio"/> 10 tokens             |
| <input checked="" type="radio"/> Urn Gamble | <input type="radio"/> 20 tokens             |
| <input checked="" type="radio"/> Urn Gamble | <input type="radio"/> 30 tokens             |
| <input checked="" type="radio"/> Urn Gamble | <input type="radio"/> 40 tokens             |
| <input checked="" type="radio"/> Urn Gamble | <input type="radio"/> 50 tokens             |
| <input type="radio"/> Urn Gamble            | <input checked="" type="radio"/> 60 tokens  |
| <input type="radio"/> Urn Gamble            | <input checked="" type="radio"/> 70 tokens  |
| <input type="radio"/> Urn Gamble            | <input checked="" type="radio"/> 80 tokens  |
| <input type="radio"/> Urn Gamble            | <input checked="" type="radio"/> 90 tokens  |
| <input type="radio"/> Urn Gamble            | <input checked="" type="radio"/> 100 tokens |
| <input type="radio"/> Urn Gamble            | <input checked="" type="radio"/> 110 tokens |
| <input type="radio"/> Urn Gamble            | <input checked="" type="radio"/> 120 tokens |
| <input type="radio"/> Urn Gamble            | <input checked="" type="radio"/> 130 tokens |
| <input type="radio"/> Urn Gamble            | <input checked="" type="radio"/> 140 tokens |
| <input type="radio"/> Urn Gamble            | <input checked="" type="radio"/> 150 tokens |

Figure B.17: Incentivized Elicitation of Impatience (Caltech)

Suppose you were offered an immediate payment of \$100 or a delayed payment 30 days from now. How much would you need to be paid in 30 days in order to forgo \$100 immediately?

110

Figure B.18: Incentivized Elicitation of Altruism (Caltech, UBC, and MTurk)

You now have **300 tokens to be divided between you and another**, randomly chosen, survey participant.

All other survey participants will be given the same choice: that is, they will be given 300 tokens to divide between themselves and another participant.

Your payoff from this section will be how much you allocate to yourself, plus how much is allocated to you by another randomly chosen participant. Note that the recipient, the participant that receives money from you, and the participant that you receive money from will be different, and both will be chosen randomly.

Amount for you:

Amount for recipient:

(Amounts entered should be numbers between 0 and 300.)